政策

Chen Xiang and Terry van Gevelt. 2022. “Political signalling and emissions trading schemes in China: Insights from Guangdong Province.” Energy for Sustainable Development, 17, December 2022, Pp. 307-314. Publisher's VersionAbstract
China's approach to environmental regulation relies heavily on campaign-style enforcement and blunt-force regulation. While considered effective in the short run, this approach is often inefficient and generates unintended regulatory outcomes in the longer run. At the same time, China continues to experiment with the use of market-based approaches that are theoretically more efficient and have the potential to facilitate sustained reductions in carbon emissions. Arguably the most high-profile example is the Guangdong Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which was launched in 2013 as a national pilot scheme. We construct a synthetic control of Guangdong and analyse 51,076 party-led newspaper reports to show that while the ETS reduced emissions in the short run, these reductions were systematically associated with political signalling. Notably, emissions reduced substantially upon the announcement of the ETS in 2011 – a full two years before the scheme was scheduled to begin – before rebounding to near pre-ETS announcement levels by 2017. The presence of an anticipation effect and the systematic association between political signalling and emissions reductions mirrors findings on China's more direct approaches to environmental regulation. Our findings suggest that market-based mechanisms in China may not be qualitatively different from more direct forms of environmental regulation.
Jianglong Li and Mun Sing Ho. 2024. “End-year China wind power installation rush reduces electric system reliability.” Energy Economics, 133, May 2024, Pp. 107507. Publisher's VersionAbstract
The urgent challenge posed by climate change has catalyzed global efforts to transition towards sustainable energy sources, with wind power emerging as a pivotal component. However, the rapid expansion of renewable energy sources has raised concerns about electric system reliability, given their intermittent and hard-to-forecast nature. China has provided incentives that promoted the rapid expansion of wind. However, the structure of some incentives led to the phenomenon of end-year rushes to install wind power before incentives expire. Leveraging panel data from China's provinces, we empirically estimate the impact of these installation rushes on electric reliability. We find significant adverse effects, with a one-standard-deviation increase in installation rush corresponding to a 0.767% decrease in the reliability rate and a 39.6-min increase in annual outage duration. Notably, urban areas and the northwestern grid are particularly vulnerable to the disruptions caused by year-end installation rushes. In the urban areas of the northwestern grid, we identify the potential for substantial improvements in the lower bound of the reliability rate, from 98.86% to 99.37%, or a reduction in outage duration from 11.65 h to 7.16 h. These findings show the importance of structuring incentives properly and the importance of improvements in grid infrastructure and management in the transition to a low-carbon world.
Qiang Liu

刘强 Qiang Liu

清华大学能源环境经济研究所博士研究生
哈佛中国项目交流博士生
刘强是清华大学能源环境经济研究所的博士研究生。他的研究兴趣是能源和气候政策。目前,刘强的研究重点是估算中国人为甲烷排放量,并研究中国的甲烷减排途径。
2024 Feb 01

Application Deadline for Visiting Researcher or Postdoctoral Fellow Positions

(All day)

Applications are now open to join us for academic year 2024-25. Visits will typically fall between August 2024 and August 2025, although visits that fall outside of the academic year would also be considered. Click here for more information on our Visiting Researcher program. 

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Chen Xiang and Qiang Xin. 2023. “Small states as helpless pawns? Panama’s diplomatic strategy over the Taiwan Strait.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs. Publisher's VersionAbstract
A traditional great power stereotype of small states is that of helpless pawns in world politics. After Panama severed its longstanding diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 2017, small state diplomacy once again came under the spotlight. By tracing Panama’s convoluted diplomatic relations over the Taiwan Strait since 1949, we argue that, rather than great power competition alone, it is Panama’s state capacity and its strategic calculations about external threats that account for the shifts in its relations with Taiwan and Mainland China. We further identify five strategies adopted by Panama: bandwagoning, status-seeking, issue linkages, two-sided bargaining, and diplomatic recognition. By bringing agency back into the agent-structure debate, this article shows how, as an agent, Panama has maximised its action space and sheds light on Taiwan administration’s shrinking international recognition against the backdrop of the rising global influence of the People’s Republic of China.

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